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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Francisco Pete Tarin appeals from the district court's Judgment summarily
dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. On appeal, Mr. Tarin contends that
the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in its entirety because, with
regard to each of his three claims, the evidence was uncontroverted and sufficient to
raise a genuine issue of material fact. Mr. Tarin further contends that the district court
erred in relying on its memory of the proceedings in dismissing his petition. Therefore,
under Idaho's post-conviction statute, the district court erred by failing to hold an
evidentiary hearing.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the erroneous contentions of the State,
made in its Respondent's Brief.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. Tarin's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUE
the district court err in sua sponte summarily dismissing Mr. Tarin's Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief where the facts supporting each claim were uncontroverted?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Sua Sponte Summarily Dismissing Mr. Tarin's Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief Where The Facts Supporting Each Claim Were Uncontroverted
Mr. Tarin established that issues of material fact existed as to his assertions that
his trial counsel was ineffective for telling him that he would receive concurrent
sentences and probation, for failing to inform the district court at sentencing that an
alternative sentencing option involving a treatment program had been arranged, and for
asking the district court to increase Mr. Tarin's sentence at the hearing on Mr. Tarin's
I.C.R. 35 motion for leniency. In support of his claims, Mr. Tarin submitted evidence in
the form of a sworn affidavit. There was no evidence submitted which controverted any
of Mr. Tarin's post-conviction claims as the State did not file an Answer or any affidavits,
and the district court did not take judicial notice of the underlying file. As such, Mr. Tarin
certainly should have been allotted an evidentiary hearing on all three of his claims.
The State cites Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 522 (2007), for the proposition
that "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do
not justify relief as a matter of law." (Respondent's Brief, p.7.) However, if the petitioner
presents some shred of evidentiary support for his allegations, the district court must
take the petitioner's allegations as true, at least until such time as they are controverted
by the State. Tramel v. State, 92 Idaho 643, 646 (1968) (holding that the State's motion
to dismiss was unsupported by any affidavits or depositions, and therefore did not
"controvert" the facts alleged in the petitioner's application).

This is so even if the

allegations appear incredible on their face. Id. The district court is required to accept
the petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, but is not required to accept the
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petitioner's conclusion

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). Thus, only

State controverts the petitioner's allegations can the district court consider the

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612 (Ct App. 1982).
The facts of this case are similar to those in Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801
(1992). In Matthews, there was no answer or motion whatsoever filed by the State and,
while the district court had only taken "judicial notice" of its recollection of the trial
proceedings, it had failed to take judicial notice of the court record. Id. at 807. Based
on the lack of evidence, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded, "[i]t follows that there is
insufficient record
allegations."

Id.

and

certainly nothing which serves to controvert Matthews'

The Court reversed the district court and remanded the case for

determination of the ineffective assistance of counsel issue. Id. at 809
Here, it is uncontested that the State chose not to file an Answer or submit any
evidence controverting Mr. Tarin's claims.

Further, the State did not respond to

Mr. Tarin's petition or any other pleadings filed in the post-conviction case. Nor did the
State request that the district court take judicial notice of the record in the underlying
case.

Although the district court made multiple references to its intent to obtain the

underlying case file, it evidently failed to do so and failed to take judicial notice of its
contents.

(6/18/14 Tr., p.7, L.25 - p.8, L.1, p.9, Ls.1-12; 7/9/14 Tr., p.11, Ls.18-24.)

Because the district court did not, sua sponte, take judicial notice of the record in the
underlying case, and the State did not submit an adequate record controverting his
claims, Mr. Tarin's allegations went unrebutted and summary dismissal of all claims was
erroneous.
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The State asserts that "Because the district court addressed Tarin's third claim
his own post-conviction counsel, Tarin is

based on underlying facts represented

estopped from now asserting that the district court erred by relying solely on its own
memory of the Rule 35 hearing." (Respondent's Brief, p.22.) The State apparently is
asserting that because post-conviction counsel quickly summarized what had occurred
during a prior proceeding in front of the district court, Mr. Tarin may not now assert that
it was error for the district court to rely on its memory of the proceedings in the
underlying case.

However, post-conviction counsel did not ask the district court to

neglect to review either an audio recording or a transcript of the proceedings. When it
became apparent to petitioner's counsel that the district court had not reviewed either
an audio recording or a transcript of the prior proceedings, counsel helpfully attempted
to summarize for the court the substance of the hearing and the court's rulings during
the hearing (7/9/15 Tr., p.11, L.25 - p.13, L.12); however, Mr. Tarin's counsel did not
ask the district court to rule without first reviewing the record.

When it did rule, the

district court relied both on the representations of Mr. Tarin's counsel, who had listened
to the audio recording of the I.C.R. 35 hearing, and the district court's own memory of
what transpired at the LC R. 35 hearing, in dismissing the petition. (6/18/14 Tr., p.7,
Ls.5-24; 7/9/14 Tr., p. 11, L.25-p.12, L.7; p.15, L.3-p.18, L.13.)
Finally, case law is clear that such is error as it is not possible for a reviewing
court to determine the propriety of summary dismissal where no transcript was prepared
and submitted into evidence. See Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807-808 (1992)
(holding that judicial notice of prior reported but not transcribed testimony is not allowed
because conclusions drawn from that source are incapable of appellate review); c.f

5

Navarro v. Yonkers, 144 Idaho 882, 887 (2007) (holding that the Court was provided
judicial notice of the magistrate judge's

a transcript of the relevant hearing;

personal recollection of the testimony was proper).
The district court's erroneous reliance on its memory also applied to Mr. Tarin's
second claim-trial counsel's failure to explore viable alternatives to incarceration and
failure to ask the district court for an incarceration alternative. Once again, the district
court appears to have been relying on its memory in finding that it was a tactical
decision by trial counsel, "I don't know what - the status of any alternatives that might
have been in the process of being explored. They were not presented to the Court to
my recollection." (7/9/15 Tr., p.17, Ls.13-16.) Such was error, as a district court is not
permitted to rely exclusively upon its own memory of prior proceedings in sua sponte
dismissing a post-conviction petition.
Next, the State claims that the district court did apply the correct standard

in

analyzing the second claim of Mr. Tarin's petition. In analyzing Mr. Tarin's claim that his
counsel failed to present to the district court an alternative sentencing arrangement
involving inpatient drug/alcohol treatment, the district court concluded,
... absent a showing that somehow -- or even a representation under
oath that would meet the threshold prima facie requirement that counsel
knew of such and that it fell below the community standard of care for a
defense attorney to ignore that, I can't even entertain a petition for relief in
that regard.
(7/9/14 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-22.)

The State now asserts that the Strickland standard

necessitates a community standard of care, i.e., analysis using "standards of practice
among the community's attorneys." (Respondent's Brief, p.9.)
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The correct standard for evaluating whether an attorney's assistance may have
ineffective is whether trial counsel's performance fell below an objective standard
reasonableness.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Aragon v.

State, 114 Idaho 758, 760 (1988).

'The proper measure of attorney performance

remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466
U.S. at 688. The analysis is not particularized to the practice of law in a certain region
and the State's claim that the comment related to the "standards of practice among the
community's attorneys" (Respondent's Brief, p.9), does not mitigate the fact that the
district court used an incorrect standard in finding Mr. Tarin had not met his burden.
Where the district court failed to analyze the performance of Mr. Tarin's trial counsel
utilizing the proper standard, its dismissal of Mr. Tarin's claims was error.

Further,

Mr. Tarin demonstrated deficient performance and asserted prejudice on each of the
three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. (R., pp.13, 16, 28, 36-37.)
As for Mr. Tarin's assertion that his counsel promised he would be sentenced to
probation and concurrent sentences, the State claims that Mr. Tarin's post-conviction
counsel conceded this issue.

(Respondent's Brief, pp 11-13.)

inaccurate summary of counsel's argument.

However, this is an

Mr. Tarin's counsel did not advise the

district court that he was conceding the issue, but apparently advised the district court
that he was aware of countervailing authority regarding this issue.
Ls.16-22; R., p.35.)

(7/9/14 Tr., p.16,

While Mr. Tarin's counsel did acknowledge that if only defense

counsel assured him that he would get probation, such would not constitute grounds for
post-conviction relief, a genuine issue of material fact still exists-whether it was only
defense counsel who made the assurances, or whether the district court and the

7

prosecutor also made similar assurances such as in the case of a binding plea
agreement pursuant to I.C R. 11 (f)(1 )(e). In this case, the record is devoid of evidence
indicating that the assurance of leniency was only made by counsel, and not pursuant to
a plea agreement binding on both the prosecutor and the district court.

(7/9/14

Tr., p.16, Ls.20-22; R., p.35 (citing Walker v. State, 92 Idaho 517, 521 (1968) (holding
that while an assurance of leniency solely and only by counsel does not constitute
grounds for post-conviction relief, but noting that the petitioner did not contend that his
guilty plea was entered upon a commitment from any responsible state official)).)
Regarding the second claim, counsel's failure to impart to the district court his
knowledge that Mr. Tarin's family had arranged for an alternative sentence-treatment
in lieu of incarceration-fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Because
there is no evidence controverting the petitioner's assertions, and the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the petitioner, it is not clear whether counsel ever
proposed any alternative to incarceration

Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact

exists as to whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to advise the
district court of the available treatment option(s).
As for the third claim, the State claims that Mr. Tarin's argument should not be
considered on appeal as "Tarin has not presented any authority to support his argument
that counsel's attempt to modify his sentences in this manner constituted an attempt to
increase his sentences." (Respondent's Brief, p.21.)

However, the State apparently

ignores the fact that (according to the representations of petitioner's counsel) the district
court denied the motion, because the court did not believe it had the legal authority to
increase the sentence from a 2 year fixed to a 3.5 year fixed sentence.
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(7/9/14

, p.12, Ls.8-24.) Thus, the district court's ruling, as summarized by the petitioner's
provides support for Mr. Tarin's
increased.

that his counsel asked that the sentence

And because there is no evidence controverting the petitioner's

assertions, and the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the
petitioner, it is not clear whether counsel argued a legal impossibility, advocated against
his client's wishes, or just wasted an opportunity for the district court to consider
leniency. Therefore, a genuine issue of material fact exists.
In sum, no evidence was introduced which controverted the attestations
contained in Mr. Tarin's petition and affidavit

The district court had no conflicting

evidence on which to find that Mr. Tarin had not met his burden or had failed to
establish a genuine issue of material fact Thus, the district court erred in sua sponte
summarily dismissing the Petition in its entirety.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Tarin respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, vacate the judgment, and
remand the case for an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2015.

)
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appe

g

e Public Defender
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